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FACE TO FACE: THE CRIME LAB EXCEPTION OF
RULE 803(8) OF THE MONTANA RULES OF
EVIDENCE AND THE MONTANA
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Nicholas J. Weilhammer*

they will
"Who are the witnesses?... Bring them before me, and
1
swear their falsehoods when they meet me face to face."

I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of scientific evidence in the courtroom

during the latter part of this century2 has left courts scrambling3
to find a legal framework in which to analyze such evidence.
Questions of admissibility and reliability often arise in
determining the constitutionality of scientific evidence. Reports
from crime labs, a primary source for generating scientific
evidence, have generally been admitted into evidence regardless
of whether the author was called to testify. 4 The Montana
Supreme Court had always allowed lab reports to be admitted
into evidence without the author testifying, both before and
after the adoption of Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules of
5
Evidence.
*1 would like to extend special thanks to Bill Unger, Administrator of the Forensic
Science Division, for his invaluable assistance.
1. Delegate J.K Toole of Lewis & Clark County at the 1889 Montana
Constitutional Convention, paraphrasing Queen Mary of Scotland. The delegates were
debating the proposed Confrontation and Detention Clauses. Proceedingsand Debates of
the ConstitutionalConvention 1889, at 256 (1921).
2. See Study to Investigate use of Scientific Evidence, 7 NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE
CTS. REP. 1 (Aug. 1980). A 1980 survey revealed that fifty percent of litigators
encountered scientific testimony in one-third of their trials.
3. See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE §§ 1-7 (2d ed. 1993); 1, 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE (1997).
4. See infra note 111.
5. MONT. R. EvID. 803(8) states: "Public records and reports. To the extent not
otherwise provided in this paragraph, records, reports, statements, or data compilations
in any form of a public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and
regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and
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In State v. Clark,6 the Montana Supreme Court
unanimously held unconstitutional the portion of 803(8) of the
Montana Rules of Evidence, which concerns the admission of
state crime lab reports. In so doing, the court overstepped
Montana statutory and common law, as well as federal
precedent. The court held that admission of crime lab reports
without requiring the author of the report to testify violates
Article II, Sections 17 and 24 of the Montana Constitution. 7 In
particular, the court based its holding on the Confrontation
Clause's archaic language of "face to face,"8 which, taken
literally, would effectively eliminate several well-established
hearsay exceptions. 9
This case note explores the structure and purpose of the
Montana crime lab as well as the long history of Montana's
Confrontation Clause in a national context, and discusses the
sweeping language of Clark, which casts doubt on the future
existence of well-established hearsay exceptions in criminal
trials. The decision comes at a price for Montanans, whose
as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law. The following are not within this exception
to the hearsay rule: (i) investigative reports by police and other law enforcement
personnel; (ii) investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public office, or
an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party; (iii) factual findings offered
by the government in criminal cases; (iv) factual findings resulting from special
investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident; and (v) any matter as to which
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
However, written reports from the Montana state crime laboratory are within this
exception to the hearsay rule when the state has notified the court and opposingparties in
writing of its intention to offer such report or reports in evidence at trial in sufficient time
for the party not offering the report or reports (1) to obtain the depositions before trial of
the person or persons responsible for compiling such reports, or (2) to subpoena the
attendanceof saidpersons at trial." (emphasis added).
6. State v. Clark, _ Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766 (1998).
7. Id. at -, 964 P.2d at 772-73.
Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution states: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution states: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against
him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, subject to the right of the state to have a change of
venue for any of the causes for which the defendant may obtain the same." (emphasis
added).
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. Rule 803 of the Montana Rules of Evidence has twenty-three enumerated
exceptions, such as the recorded recollection exception, and one residual exception. Rule
804 of the Montana Rules of Evidence has four enumerated exceptions, such as the dying
declaration exception, and one residual exception.
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small population must continuously finance and enforce
decisions handed down by the court, which are not supported
legislatively or by common law. As a result, the Montana
legislature should take notice of the existence of the archaic
phraseology in Montana's Confrontation Clause, evaluate and
understand its roots, and consider following the recent national
trend of modernizing the Clause's language. 10
II. STATE V. CLARK
A. Summary of Facts
On the morning of March 26, 1996, Ronald A. Clark hit the
side of a car while driving his Chrysler Newport in Bozeman,
Montana." Clark failed to stop at the scene of the accident, and
continued driving.' 2 At another intersection, Clark hit the back
of a van that was waiting at a stop sign.' 3 Clark stopped, and
tried to persuade the driver of the van, Beverly Garrison14
Lammey, to settle the incident without calling the police.
Garrison-Lammey insisted on calling the police.' 5 Not wanting
to leave her children in the van unattended, she asked Clark if
he would call the police.' 6 Clark went to the nearest gas station,
entered, and exited without calling the police. 17 Clark then fled
north on foot.' 8 Garrison-Lammey flagged down a Bozeman
police officer in the area, who called in the accident to the
Bozeman dispatch.' 9 Officer McLane responded, and spotted a
man jogging in the area.20 McLane followed the man by car and
then by foot. 2' McLane identified himself as a police officer and
warned Clark to "freeze," but Clark continued to run.22 McLane
took him into custody. 23 Clark, uncooperative at the time of his
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
Id.
See

discussion infra Part VI.
Respondent's Brief at 4, Clark (No. 97-096).
id.
id. at 4-5.
id. at 5.
id.
id.
Respondent's Brief at 5, Clark (No. 97-096).
id.
id.
id.
id. at 4.
Respondent's Brief at 5-6, Clark (No. 97-096).
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arrest, refused to be handcuffed or give McLane his name. 24
Clark could not effectively maintain his balance, and had a
25
strong odor of alcohol on his breath.
After Clark's arrest, an inventory of his belongings on his
person and impounded car included: a set of Chrysler keys, a
hypodermic needle and syringe wrapped inside a piece of
newspaper, numerous pairs of rubber gloves, and a small clear
plastic bag which contained a brown crystal substance, later
identified as amphetamine. 26 The pat search of Clark, who could
27
not stand on his own, required the assistance of two officers.
At the detention center, Clark complained of tingling in his toes
and legs, and had trouble standing without assistance or sitting
28
in a chair.
On April 3, 1996, Clark was charged 29 with two felony
drugs, 30
possession of dangerous
counts of criminal
misdemeanor
counts
of criminal
possession of drug
paraphernalia, 31 second offense DUI, 32 failure to remain at the
scene of an accident, 33 failure of duty to stop upon striking an
unattended vehicle, 34 and failure to carry proof of insurance. 35
The state filed a motion for leave to file an amended information
on October 21, 1996, to consolidate counts one and two, and to
change the name of the dangerous drug from methamphetamine
to amphetamine. 36 After oral argument on the State's motion,
the State filed an amended affidavit on October 22, 1996, upon
the court's recommendation. 37 The court permitted the State
leave to file an amended information on October 23, 1996.38 The
State did so, consolidating counts one and two, and charging

24. See id. at 6.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See State v. Clark, __ Mont.__, 964 P.2d 766, 768 (1998).
30. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102(1) (1997), which states: "A person commits
the offense of criminal possession of dangerous drugs if he possesses any dangerous
drug, as defined in 50-32-101."
31. See MONT. CODE ANN.§ 45-10-103 (1997).
32. See id.§ 61-8-401.
33. See id. § 61-7-104.
34. See id. § 61-7-106.
35. See id. § 61-6-302.
36. See State v. Clark, __ Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766, 768-69 (1998).
37. See id. at __, 964 P.2d at 769.
38. See id.
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Clark with criminal possession of amphetamine. 39
On October 21, 1996, the State filed a notice of intent to
offer the written crime lab report as evidence of criminal
possession of dangerous drugs pursuant to 803(8) of the
Montana Rules of Evidence. 40 Clark argued that admitting the
lab report without calling its author violated his right to
confrontation, and chose not to subpoena her.41 The court ruled
that pursuant to Rule 803(8), Clark would have to subpoena the
42
author as a witness if he desired her presence.
On November 27, 1996, a jury convicted Clark of criminal
possession of dangerous drugs, criminal possession of drug
paraphernalia, DUI, failure to remain at the scene of an
accident, and failure of duty to stop upon striking an unattended
vehicle. 43 On January 7, 1997, Clark was sentenced to five years
with thirty-three days suspended for criminal possession of
dangerous drugs, six months with thirty days suspended for
criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, and ninety days for
counts three, four and five."
The sentences were to run
45
concurrently.
The issue that Clark presented on appeal is whether the
portion of 803(8) that governs the introduction of written reports
from the Montana state crime laboratory violates the
46
Confrontation Clause.
B. Holding
The Montana Supreme Court recognized that it presumes a
legislative enactment to be constitutional, and will uphold it on
review unless proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
47
doubt.
Clark asserted that the portion of 803(8) of the Montana
Rules of Evidence that governs the introduction of state crime

39.

See id.

40.

See id.

41.
42.
43.

See id.
See State v. Clark, __ Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766, 769 (1998).
See id.

44.
45.

See id.
See id.

46. See id. at,
964 P.2d at 768.
47. See id. at -, 964 P.2d at 770 (citing Zempel v. Uninsured Employers' Fund,
282 Mont. 424, 428, 938 P.2d 658, 661 (1997) (holding that Workers' Compensation Act
did not deny equal protection of the laws or access to the courts under the Montana
Constitution to plaintiff injured while working for business on Flathead Reservation)).
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lab reports48 violated his right to confront and cross-examine his
"accuser."
He argued that the court, by admitting the lab
report, denied him a chance to cross-examine the technician, to
observe her at trial, to cast doubt on the accuracy of her report,
and to question the chain of custody. 49 The State rejected
Clark's argument, citing federal court decisions holding that
admitting crime lab reports without requiring the technician to
testify does not violate the Confrontation Clause of the United
States Constitution's Confrontation Clause. 0
The court invoked its right to interpret the Montana
Confrontation Clause to afford greater protection than the
United States Constitution. 5 1 The court cited State v. Stever5 2 to
illustrate that it was not bound by a United States Supreme
53
Court interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.
The court distinguished Montana's Confrontation Clause
from the federal version by its language that guarantees the
defendant the right "to meet witnesses against him face to
face." 54 The court discussed the importance of full cross55
examination as a critical aspect of the right of confrontation,
which is a fundamental right of an accused person in a criminal
prosecution. 56
According to the court, cross-examination
produces truth.57 Body language, demeanor, and hesitancy in
the response of the witness can communicate to the fact-finder

48. See State v. Clark, __ Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766, 770 (1998).
49. See id.
50. See id. at _, 964 P.2d at 770-71 (citing United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418,
422 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding lab reports identifying the substance in drug case may be
introduced without requiring the state to prove the author's unavailability)); See also
Respondent's Brief at 9-11, Clark (No. 97-096).
51. See id. at -, 964 P.2d at 771 (citing Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 215, 713
P.2d 495, 500-01 (1985) (holding that Montana's Equal Protection Clause provides a
separate ground from the federal version on which rights of Montanans may be founded),
overruled on other grounds by Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 26, 776 P.2d
488, 491 (1989)).
52. 225 Mont. 336, 344, 732 P.2d 853, 858 (1987) (holding that admission of
coconspirator's statements under coconspirator exception to hearsay rule did not violate
defendant's right of confrontation).
53. State v. Clark,__ Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (1998).
54. Id. (quoting MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24, supra note 7).
55. See id. (citing State v. Young, 249 Mont. 257, 260, 815 P.2d 590, 592 (1991)
(holding the defendant's right of confrontation was abridged by trial court's refusal to
grant immunity to witness who invoked Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination before cross-examination was completed)).
56. See id.
57. See id.
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as much as spoken words. 58
The court held that due to the critical nature of the lab
report evidence, Clark was entitled to inquire into the
technician's experience, background, training, as well as method
and manner of conducting the tests.59 The court stated that the
framers of the Montana Constitution appreciated the need for
such safeguards, and purposely distinguished Montana's
Constitution from the federal version. 60 The court held that the
portion of 803(8) of the Montana Rules of Evidence governing
the introduction of crime lab reports violates Article II, Section
61
24, of the Montana Constitution.
III. THE CRIME LAB
A. Procedures,Structure, and Purpose
All of the parties in Clark, including the court, incorrectly
62
refer to the author of the crime lab report as a "technician."
According to Bill Unger, Administrator of the Forensic Science
Division, the correct title is "Forensic Scientist."63 Forensic
scientists have codified licensing requirements.64 If an employee
is hired with no prior forensic experience, the employee
undergoes an in-house training period from six to sixteen
months, depending on the employee's qualifications. 65
All
employees, regardless of their prior experience, must complete
66
the Forensic Science Division's level of proficiency.
The crime lab employs different techniques for different

58. See id.
59. State v. Clark, __ Mont. -,
964 P.2d 766, 771 (1998).
60. See id.
61. See id. at 771-72.
62. Id. at -, 964 P.2d at 770-72; Respondent's Brief at 11, 17, Clark (No. 97-096);
Appellant's Brief at 16-18, Clark (No. 97-096).
63. Letter from Bill Unger, Administrator of the Forensic Science Division, to
Nicholas J. Weilhammer (Nov. 11, 1998) (on file with author).
64. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-34-303(1) (1997), which states: "The board shall
issue a clinical laboratory scientist license to an individual who meets the qualifications
as promulgated by rules of the board. At a minimum, a licensee must be a person who:
has graduated with a baccalaureate degree, including a minimum number of hours in
areas or disciplines established by rule by the board; and has passed a certifying
examination approved by the board." (Sections 2 and 3 list requirements for laboratory
specialists and laboratory technicians).
65. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
66. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
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kinds of submissions. 67 Each technique is designed to insure
reliable, accurate lab results. For example, in a suspected
marijuana sample, the scientist, upon receiving the sample,
examines the packaging containing the sample to ensure it is
properly sealed with evidence tape, and no sign of entry is
present. 68
The evidence is then opened, inventoried, and
69
weighed.
Afterwards, the scientist examines the evidence
microscopically. 70
A small portion is removed for further
analysis, and the remainder is repackaged and sealed. 71 If the
analysis requires the entire sample, which rarely occurs, the lab
will call the submitting agency and ask them to notify the
defense attorney. 72 The lab will then wait for permission to use
the sample. 73 A portion of the sample is usually kept to allow
the defense the opportunity to do an independent analysis. 74 To
ensure against contamination, blanks are run to ensure
accuracy. 75
The evidence then undergoes an analysis by
subjecting it to methanol, and the extraction is then analyzed by
gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). 76 When the
test is complete, a peer review is done of the analysis, and the
scientist completes her report. 77 After the report is written,
78
there is a supervisory review before the lab issues the report.
The remaining evidence is then returned to the submitting
agency. 79 The only concern of the scientist is to identify the

67. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
68. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
69. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
70. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
71. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
72. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
73. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
74. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
75. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63; see also Letter from Bill Unger, Administrator of the Forensic Science Division, to Nicholas J. Weilhammer (Jan. 29, 1999) (on
file with author) ("[A] blank (usually the reagent is methanol) is run to show there is no
contamination from the prior run. If there is a contamination another blank is run and
this will continue until the column is clean and there is no possibility the result of a case
is due to the immediate prior case.").
76. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
For an explanation of gas
chromatography coupled to mass spectrometry, see Thomas G. Chesteen, Coupling Gas
Chromatography to Mass Chromatography <http'/www.shsu.edu/-chemistry/primers/
gcms.html>; Gas Chromatography/MassSpectrometry-GC/MS <http//www.katzlabs.
com/gcms.htm>.
77. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
78. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
79. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
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submission;8 0 therefore, Clark's reference to the forensic
81
scientist as an "accuser" seems misplaced.
The hearsay exception of Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules
82
of Evidence does not extend to "law enforcement personnel."
Forensic scientists regularly train law enforcement at the
Montana Law Enforcement Academy, but are not considered
"law enforcement."8 3 Forensic scientists at the Montana crime
lab do not undergo any formal law enforcement training.8 4 The
lab's role is more pedagogical-training law enforcement as to
the proper collection, packaging and submission of evidence to
the lab.8 5 The lab's statutory duty encompasses analysis for law
enforcement and other state agencies.8 6 They also perform urine
analysis for state correctional facilities, which may or may not
87
be used in litigation.
Regretfully, the court in Clark does not address its
infringement on the efficiency of the crime lab, or the
practicalities of its decision. Currently, the crime lab receives in
excess of 4000 submissions a year for sampling, with some
88
If
submissions going to two or more sections of the lab.
Montana crime rates adhere to national statistics, the number of
submissions to the crime lab dealing with the identification of
89
controlled substances will undoubtedly increase over time.
80. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
81. Appellant's Brief at 16, Clark (No. 97-096). While the Confrontation Clause
encompasses "witnesses," and not simply "accusers," Clark inadvertently offers a
possible distinction between those who accuse and those who simply report unbiased
facts.
82. See supra note 5.
83. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
84. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
85. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
86. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-3-301 (1997), which states: "There is a laboratory of
criminalistics within the department of justice. The laboratory's purpose is to perform
analysis of specimens submitted by all Montana state, county, or city law enforcement
officers and all state agencies and referral specimens from other states if accepted by the
laboratory director. The laboratory's functions include analysis of toxicologic and
criminalistic specimens which the laboratory director considers within the performance
capability of the laboratory."
87. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
88. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63:
The number of cases varies significantly in our lab, i.e. a Firearms Examiner
may have 60 cases a year [sic] a Latent Fingerprint Examiner may have 15
cases a month, and a Chemist may have 60 cases a month. The number of
cases completed doesn't reflect workload.
89. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reveal that in 1993, there were 791,789
arrests nationally for illegal possession, an increase of 43.3% since 1984. See Drug and
Crime Facts, 1994 <http:///www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/dcfacts.txt>.
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Obviously, the crime lab is concerned with the impact Clark will
have in the future concerning the amount of time the scientists
must spend testifying. 90 In the few months since Clark, the lab
has already noticed a "significant" increase in the number of
subpoenas of its forensic scientists. 9 1
Before Rule 803(8) was adopted, the forensic scientist often
testified over uncontested matters.9 2 The State Bar of Montana
Criminal Defense Section and the Montana Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers argue that the parties may stipulate
to the admission of the lab report. 93 While this possibility is
conceivable, it is highly unlikely that any defense attorney
would have an interest in aiding the state in its prosecution of
the attorney's client who is on trial for criminal possession. The
defendant is more likely to prey upon the confusion and
misunderstanding of the lay juror,9 4 who may already have a
mistrust of science. Isolated cases of misconduct by other lab
scientists 95 will undoubtedly be brought up by the defense,
creating an unwarranted suspicion in the minds of the jury that
crime lab reports in general are unreliable.
B. Admitting Crime Lab Reports in Montana
Before the Montana Rules of Evidence were adopted,
Montana accepted reports from the crime lab without calling the
author to testify. 96 In 1975, the court unanimously held a
written criminal laboratory report identifying a substance taken

90. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
91. See Jan. 29, 1999 letter, supra note 75 (Though, as Unger notes, the cases since
Clark are just beginning to be litigated; therefore, it is hard to tell what precise impact
Clark will have.).
92. See Brief of Amici Curiae at Exhibit A-4, Clark (No. 97-096).
93. See id. at 8 ("An accused person may choose not to challenge the laboratory's
test results as to the nature of the drug in question; rather, she may defend on the
theory that she did not possess the drugs. In such a case, it might be possible to
stipulate to the admissibility of a laboratory report.").
94.

THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT,

commenting on scientific evidence: "Critics have objected that judges cannot make
appropriate decisions because they lack technical training, that jurors do not
comprehend the complexity of the evidence they are supposed to analyze. .. "
CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & GOV'T, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES 11

(1993).
95. In the Matter of West Virginia State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va.
1993) (upholding lower court's finding that a serologist from the state crime laboratory
had falsified evidence) (cited in the Brief of Amici Curiae at 9, Clark (No. 97-096)).
96. See State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204(1975).
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from the defendant as marijuana admissible under the Uniform
97
Official Reports as Evidence Act.

The implementation of 803(8) of the Montana Rules of
Evidence in 1977 had seemingly overruled Snider.98 The old
rule's adoption caused substantial difficulties in the operation of
the crime lab, prompting the Attorney General to ask the
Montana Supreme Court Commission on Rules of Evidence
(Commission) to reconsider the question. 99 The Commission
amended 803(8) with the crime lab exception, resulting in the
current version of Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules of
Evidence. 100
The Commission decided that there was no
violation of confrontational rights under the proposed rule since
the defendant had the right to subpoena the witness, or request
the trial court to call the witness pursuant to Rule 614 of the
Montana Rules of Evidence. 10 Two of the current justices 10 2
signed the order in 1990;103 eight years later, both of them held
their order unconstitutional.
While the court had not ruled on the constitutionality of
Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules of Evidence before Clark, the
court had recognized Rule 803(8). In 1992, the court in State v.
Zackuse' ° allowed the crime lab report into evidence, including
a chain of custody log for drug evidence that listed names of
persons at the crime lab who handled the evidence. 05 In State
v. Bradley,10 6 the court held that the crime lab report containing
the defendant's blood test was within the hearsay exception of
Rule 803(8) of the Montana Rules of Evidence. 10 7

97. See id. The MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-901-1 (1947) stated: "Written reports
of findings of fact made by officers of this state, on a matter within the scope of their
duty as defined by statute, shall, in so far as relevant, be admitted as evidence of the

matters stated therein."
98. See Brief of Amici Curiae at Exhibit A-4, Clark (No. 97-096).
99. See id. ("Laboratory personnel were required to use large amounts of time and
funds traveling to court hearings where their findings were not contested. The
alternative of changing to the equivalent Federal Rule, and admitting a wide variety of
public records now classed as hearsay, was rejected, but the Commission agreed that
laboratory reports were a special case and should be an exception to the hearsay rule.").
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Justice Hunt and Chief Justice Turnage were members of the court in 1989.
103. The court has authority pursuant to MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) to make
rules governing practice and procedure for all other courts.
104. 253 Mont. 305, 833 P.2d 143 (1992).
105. See id.
106. 262 Mont. 194, 864 P.2d 787 (1993).
107. See id.
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C. Admitting Crime Lab Reports in FederalCourt
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admission of lab
reports in federal courts 108 under the regularly conducted
activity'0 9 and public record exceptions. 110 Regardless of the
difference between Montana and Federal evidentiary rules, a
majority of federal courts have held that the admission of lab
reports without calling its author as a witness did not violate
federal confrontational rights."'
While Montana Rule of
108. Note, however, that in probation revocation hearings, courts are urged to apply
evidentiary rules flexibly. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Kindred, 918
F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding lab report could be admitted through testimony of
probation officer); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (holding confrontation rights
under the Sixth Amendment still apply in probation revocation hearings).
109. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) which states: "Records of Regularly Conducted
Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit."
110. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) which states: "Public Records and Reports. Records,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however,
in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness."
111. FIRST CIRCUIT: Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770 (1st Cir. 1990) (allowing
autopsy report for purpose of proving cause of death); SECOND CIRCUIT: United States v.
Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding chemist's report identifying substance as
cocaine admissible under business records exception); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39
(2d Cir. 1986) (holding admission of drug test identifying substance as marijuana
allowed without testimony by performing chemist); FOURTH CIRCUIT: Kay v. United
States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.) (holding admission of certificate showing blood alcohol
content of defendant did not deprive defendant of right to confrontation); FIFTH CIRCUIT:
United States v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding defendant's right of
confrontation was not violated by admission of a urinalysis report without the author's
testimony in probation revocation hearing); United States v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding urinalysis report did not violate releasee's confrontational
rights); Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding admission of laboratory
analysis through the supervisor of two of the chemists who did the report did not violate
confrontation rights); SEVENTH CIRCUIT: United States v. Pierre, 47 F.3d 241 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding results of drug test admissible in probation revocation hearing through
affidavit of lab director); EIGHTH CIRCUIT: United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding lab report identifying controlled substance, as a firmly rooted
exception to hearsay rule, did not violate Confrontation Clause); United States v. Bell,
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Evidence 803(8) differs from its federal counterpart, it is
enlightening to examine federal courts' confrontational analyses
of admitting lab reports without the author's presence.
Federal courts have justified their conclusions based on the
fact that a lab report is likely to contain detailed descriptions
112
that often will be superior to the scientist's later recollection.
Ordinarily, the author of the lab report will only be able to
testify by reference to the report. 13 The lab professional often
employs routine, standardized procedures, "exercising a special
responsibility which the law assigns to him," that assure their
The courts have placed special
independent reliability. 14
emphasis with those departments that have statutory
requirements for employment qualification.1 1 5 It is presumed
that chemists have no motivation to falsify information on
reports, thus jeopardizing their careers.1 16 In United States v.
Pierre,1 7 Judge Easterbrook added:
"What was the technician going to say on the stand? One vial of
urine looks like another; the technicians would not have
remembered what they did with [the releasee's] specimens and
therefore would have described their normal procedures, and the
judge would not have been enlightened. A court cannot resolve
scientific controversies by looking witnesses in the eye; the
question is not whether a technician believes the tests accurate
whether tests are
but whether they are accurate. To find 11out
8
accurate, one uses the methods of science."

IV. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. The Origin of Montana's ConfrontationClause
Montana is not the only state that retains the often785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding urinalysis report did not violate confrontational
rights in probation revocation hearing); United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418 (1996)
(holding lab report identifying substance as cocaine did not violate confrontation rights
as a firmly rooted hearsay exception); TENTH CIRCUIT: Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding admission of police chemist's laboratory notes did not violate
Confrontation Clause).
112. See Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 773 (1st Cir. 1990).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 775.
115. See Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1986).
116. See id.
117. 47 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 243.
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circumscribed language that requires witnesses to testify
against a defendant "face to face." 119 Given the importance that
the court attributes to this fourteenth century phraseology, 120 as
well as the framers' intent in distinguishing Montana's
Constitution from the United States Constitution, 121 it is
important to ascertain the motivation of the framers for using
such language. Unfortunately, Montana records do not go that
far back in time.
Some reasonable inferences can be made as to the origin of
Montana's Confrontation Clause.
Looking at the 1972
Constitutional Convention, the Bill of Rights Committee stated:
The committee voted unanimously to retain the former [1889
Montana Constitution] Article III, Section 16 unchanged. The
committee felt it was an admirable statement of the fundamental
procedural rights of an accused. No delegate proposals were
22
received on this provision. 1

Rick Applegate, 123 research analyst for the 1972 Bill of
Rights Committee, aligns Montana's provision with the federal
version, 124 noting that "this type of provision 'is no more than a
119.
ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 24; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7;
IND. CONST. art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11;
MASS. CONST. part 1, art. XII; MO. CONST. art. I, § 18; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.H.
CONST. part 1, art. XV; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10; OR. CONST. art I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art.
VI, § 7; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Illinois and Pennsylvania eliminated the "face to face" language in their confrontation
clauses in 1994 and 1995, respectively.
120. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 444 (1983). The word
"confront" has roots which imply the right to face accusers: "the word 'confront'
ultimately derives from the prefix 'con' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or 'opposed') and
the noun 'frons' (forehead)." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). One scholar notes
that "[i]n the first half of the sixteenth century, practitioners must have begun to use the
phrase 'face to face' to capture the essence of a defendant's right to confrontation."
Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursorsof the ConfrontationClause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 539-40 (1994).
121. See State v. Clark, -Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (1998) ("The framers of the
Montana Constitution... saw fit to distinguish our Confrontation Clause from the
United States Constitution by insuring a criminal defendant the right 'to meet the
witnesses against him face to face."').
122. Montana ConstitutionalConvention 1971-1972, Committee ProposalNo. 8: Bill
ofRights Committee, at 37 (1972).
123. Wade Dahood, Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, explained
Applegate's role: "Our work.., would not have succeeded so completely without the
intense dedication of our research analyst, Rick Applegate [sic] who listened to our
desires and expertly analyzed and researched the issues and provided the logical and
authoritative support necessary to frame these concepts...." 100 DELEGATES MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1972, at 25 (1989).

124.

After quoting the United States Confrontation Clause, Applegate says that
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restatement of a very old common law rule dating from around
1600."125 Applegate declares that the "principal design of this
provision is to permit the defendant to cross-examine his
accusers and to question their credibility." 126 Various behavior
patterns, according to Applegate, "can indicate to a jury what a
literal statement cannot."1 27 Applegate justifies face-to-face
confrontation by the court's language in State v. Storm, 128 a case
the Montana Supreme Court expressly overruled two years prior
to his Bill of Rights Committee study and the Constitutional
Convention. 29
Applegate cites a series of United States
Supreme Court cases in conveying the importance of face-to-face
130
confrontation.
In his conclusion, Applegate notes that the "rights of
confrontation and cross-examination are among those suggested
for extension to administrative hearings and legislative
investigations." 13 1 Applegate warns: "there is a potential conflict
between this right [of confrontation] and the detention
provisions of Article III, Section 17132 [of the 1889
Constitution]."1 33 On the conventional floor, there was confusion
as to how the two provisions were to be reconciled. 34 The
Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee postulated that
Montana's Constitution "also declares the right."
Rick Applegate, Montana
Constitutional Convention Comm'n, Montana Constitutional Convention Study No. 10:
Bill of Rights 170 (1972).
125. Id. (quoting DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 47 (1958)). Professor
Fellman's excerpt, written before the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment applied the Sixth Amendment to states, refers to the Sixth Amendment.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 171.
128.
127 Mont. 414, 419, 265 P.2d 971, 973 (Mont. 1953). Applegate misquotes the
following passage: "It was the right of the defendant to have the jury see and observe the
witness Hay upon the witness stand. It was his right that the jury see how Hay acted
while under direct and cross-examination. It was his right to have the jury judge the
credibility of Hay from his appearance and manner while on the witness stand. None of
these rights could be had except and unless the witness met the defendant 'face to face'
in the presence of the jury during the course of the trial." Applegate, supra note 124, at
171.
129. See Applegate, supra note 124, at 171. State v. Storm was overruled by State
v. Bouldin, 153 Mont. 276, 282, 456 P.2d 830, 833 (1969) (holding that preliminary
testimony of an absent witness was admissible).
130. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) (holding that the confrontation
right is fundamental guarantee); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies the Sixth Amendment to the states).
131. Applegate, supra note 124, at 172.
132. See infra note 139.
133. Applegate, supra note 124, at 172.
134. See 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANsCRIPTs 1773-75 (1981).
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depositions could be used, and satisfy the Confrontation Clause,
when "there has been fair process, just process, due process with
respect to that defendant."1 35 The conflict between the use of
depositions and face-to-face confrontation was recognized by the
framers of the previous Montana Constitution nearly one
hundred years prior to the 1972 Constitutional Convention. 136
On July 4, 1889, a convention of seventy-five delegates met
in Helena, Montana. 37 In the 1889 account, Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention, there is little debate
on the Confrontation Clause upon its introduction to the
convention floor. 38 However, the Detention Clause13s prompted
discussion as to the meaning and scope of face-to-face
confrontation. 40 Delegate J.K. Toole of Lewis & Clark County
expressed his displeasure over the apparent conflict between the
Confrontation Clause and the Detention Clause.' 4 ' According to
Toole, the accused had an unfettered right to confront witnesses
at trial under the Confrontation Clause in accordance with the
United States Constitution. 42 In his plea to strike the use of
depositions at trial, Toole used policy arguments from the Book
143
of Luke and Queen Mary of Scotland.
Delegate Hiram Knowles of Silver Bow County responded
by illustrating that courts had not required a witness to be
present for the preliminary examination and trial "for a great

135. Id. at 1774.
136. See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 254-61.
137. Montana ConstitutionalRevision Committee 7 (1970).
138. See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 124.
139. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 17 (1972) which stated: "That no person
shall be imprisoned for the purpose of securing his testimony in any case longer than
may be necessary in order to take his deposition. If he can give security for his
appearance at the time of trial he shall be discharged upon giving the same; if he cannot
give security his deposition shall be taken in the manner prescribed by law, and in the
presence of the accused and his counsel, or without their presence, if they shall fail to
attend the examination after reasonable notice of the time and place thereof. Any
deposition authorized by this section may be received as evidence on the trial, if the
witness shall be dead or absent from the state."
The 1972 Constitutional Convention deleted the last sentence, which
stipulated that the witness must be dead or absent from the state in order to use his
deposition at trial in lieu of live testimony.
140. See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 160-66, 254-62.
141. See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 255-57.
142. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 255 ("I undertook [Section 16] to show that
the original intention of the Constitution of the United States, when it provided that the
defendant should be entitled to meet the witness face to face meant something more
than meeting him before the committing magistrate.").
143.
See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 256.
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many years." 1' Knowles believed that the Confrontation Clause
and the Detention Clause "will be construed together by any
court in the world."1 45 Delegate Stapleton of Silver Bow County
supported Knowles' position, noting that the use of depositions
The
provided protections for the citizens of Montana. 146
committee on the whole rejected Mr. Toole's motion to strike the
47
Detention Clause, which was subsequently passed.
While the mammoth Proceedings and Debates provides
some insight as to the Confrontation Clause's origin, Montana
scholar James McClellan Hamilton notes that several proposals
were copied verbatim from the 1884 Constitutional Convention
in the interest of time and money. 14 8 Looking at the rejected
1884 Montana Constitution, one finds that Article I, Section 16
The 1884
is virtually identical to the 1889 version. 149
convention proceedings, available in longhand format, 150 reveal
the delegation largely deferred to the Bill of Rights
144. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 258 ("The gentleman [Mr. Toole of Lewis &
Clark] wishes this matter so established and fixed that the witness must be present
upon trial. As he has admitted here, this is against former decisions of the courts.").
145. See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 258.
146. See Proceedings, supra note 1, at 260 ("Now, you take the proposition of Mr.
Toole, that a deposition shall in no case be taken: take the other proposition that the
witness shall in no case be imprisoned and held as a witness; why, it necessarily results
you have got no witness when the day of trial comes, and the result is that a man who
has committed a cold-blooded murder, or any other crime that was witnessed by half a
dozen people cannot be convicted because they are all gone and there is nobody to fix the
murder at all .... The people demand that they shall be protected . .
147. See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 262.
148.

See JAMES MCCLELLAN HAMILTON, FROM WILDERNESS TO STATEHOOD 541

(1957) (noting that many sections, especially the Bill of Rights, were taken from the
Convention of 1884, and approved in the committee of the whole without discussion or
amendment).
149. MONT. CONST. of 1884 art. I, § 16 (not ratified) states: "That in criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against
him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed."
The only discrepancies from the 1889 version is the absence of the phrase
subject to the right of the state to have a change of venue for any of the causes for which
the defendant may obtain the same," which concludes the clause, and the insertion of
"all" in front of "criminal prosecutions." The latter amendment was an attempt to
conform to the Sixth Amendment. Both amendments made were on Friday, July 19th,
1889. See Proceedings,supranote 1, at 160, 167.
150. The longhand version of the proceedings and journal of minutes were found in
1970 as a result of the Secretary of State's efforts to organize Montana's territorial
records. Alexander Blewett, Preface to Index to Proceedings and Debates of the 1889
Montana Constitutional Convention, in Montana Constitutional Convention Comm'n,
Montana ConstitutionalConvention Memorandum No. 5, at iii, iii-iv (1972).
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Committee.' 5 '
In 1910, Elbert Allen found that many provisions in
Montana's constitution, particularly the Declaration of Rights,
152
were taken directly from the constitution of Colorado.
Colorado, which achieved statehood in 1876, retains the same
constitution, which was written in the same year. Colorado's
original draft 153 of its Confrontation Clause underwent a series
of amendments at the constitutional convention of 1876,15
which resulted in the first and final draft of the 1884 Montana
155
Confrontation Clause.
To continue tracing the history of Montana's Confrontation
Clause, one must follow the Lewis and Clark Trail back to
Missouri. Looking at the present-day Confrontation Clause of
156
the 1945 Missouri Constitution, one notices that Section 18(a)
contains virtually the same language as the rough draft of
In addition, Montana,
Colorado's Confrontation Clause. 157
Colorado, and Missouri all share strikingly similar provisions in
their Bill of Rights. 158 The Historical Notes reveal that the 1945
151. Proceedingsof the Convention Convened at Helena, Montana Territory, Jan. 14,
1884, microformed by Montana Historical Society. The manuscript is available at the
Secretary of State's office, the Historical Society Library, the University of Montana
Library and Montana State University Library.
152. Elbert F. Allen, Sources of the Montana Constitution (1910), reprinted in
Montana Constitutional Convention Comm'n, Montana Constitutional Convention
Memorandum No. 4, at 1-2 (1972).
153. Article II, then § 18 of the Colorado Constitution stated: "In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to meet the witnesses against
him face to face, to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf and
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country [sic]."
Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention Held in Denver, December 20, 1875, at 91
(1907).
154. The puzzling use of the word "country," most likely a misprint or inadvertent
error, was changed to "county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed." Id. at 208. Another amendment, adding "except as provided in section 19 of
this article" after "face to face," was passed and later abandoned. Id. at 208, 488.
155. See supra note 149.
156. MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) states: "Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions.
That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in
person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the
witnesses against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county."
157. Compare supra notes 149 and 153. The only discrepancy is Colorado's use of
the word "country."
158. The provisions below all share linguistic similarities:
MONT. CONST.

COLO. CONST.

MO. CONST.

Article II, § 1
Article II, § 2

Article II, § 1
Article II, § 2

Article I, § 1
Article I, § 3
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Missouri Constitutional Convention adopted the clause, without
change, from the 1875 Missouri Constitution, one year prior to
159
the Colorado Convention.
Nebraska's present-day Confrontation Clause, also contains
the same language, 160 lacking only the venue clause that
Montana added at the 1889 Constitution. 161 Unlike Missouri,
Nebraska's history of their Confrontation Clause ends in
1875.162
The Missouri Historical Notes trace Missouri's
Confrontation Clause origin back further, stating that the
provision is substantially similar to the 1865 and 1820
Constitutions. 163 Given Missouri's earlier inception into the
Union than either Montana, Colorado, or Nebraska, 164 as well as
its importance as a territorial outpost during early Western

MONT. CONST.
Article II, § 7
Article II, § 10
Article II, § 12
Article II, § 13
Article II, § 16
Article II, § 17
Article II, § 19
Article II, § 21
Article II, § 22
Article II, § 24
Article II, § 30
Article II, § 31
Article II, § 32

COLO. CONST.
Article II, § 10
Article II, § 7
Article II, § 13
Article II, § 5
Article II, § 6
Article II, § 25
Article II, § 21
Article II, § 19
Article II, § 20
Article II, § 16
Article II, § 9
Article II, § 11
Article II, § 22

MO. CONST.
Article I, § 8
Article I, § 15
Article I, § 23
Article I, § 25
Article I, § 14
Article I, § 10
Article I, § 12
Article I, § 20
Article I, § 21
Article I, § 18(a)
Article I, § 30
Article I, § 13
Article I, § 24

159. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 22 (1945).
160. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11 states: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of accusation, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses against him face to
face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed."
Compare supra notes 149, 153, and 156.
South Dakota's Confrontation Clause also contains strikingly similar
characteristics. See S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7. However, the subtle linguistic variations,
as well as the nearness in time of the South Dakota and Montana constitutional
conventions, tend to suggest that Montana's Clause has another source.
161. See supra note 149.
162. The source is credited to NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 11 (1943).
163. MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 18 (1875); Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 9
(1865).
164. Missouri achieved statehood in 1821; Nebraska and Montana became states in
1867, and 1889, respectively.
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expansion, 165 it is a likely source for Montana's Confrontation
Clause. 166 Unfortunately, no historical record from the 1820
Missouri Constitutional Convention exists.
Continuing the search for the Confrontation Clause's origin,
one finds that Pennsylvania's Confrontation Clause holds
additional clues. 167 Filling in the recently removed "face to face"
language, the current Pennsylvania Confrontation Clause looks
vaguely familiar.1 68
The Historical Notes reveal that the
Pennsylvania Constitutions of 1838 and 1790 contained
169
identical provisions, the recent amendments notwithstanding.

165.

See, e.g.,

THOMAS

D. CLARK,

FRONTIER AMERICA:

THE

STORY OF

THE

WESTWARD MOVEMENT (1959); 3 Louis HOUCK, A HISTORY OF MISSOURI (1908); JOHN
BRADBURY, TRAVELS IN THE INTERIOR OF AMERICA IN THE YEARS 1809, 1810, AND 1811
(U. of Neb. 1986); THOMAS EDWIN SPENCER, THE STORY OF OLD ST. LOUIS (1914).
Missourians have long been aware of their status as a leader in western policymaking, noting at an 1861 convention discussing civil war: 'That Missouri is an integral
part of the great West... and invites her sister States of the West ... to inaugurate a
Western policy, loyal to the Federal Constitution and the Union of the States." Journal
and Proceedings of the Missouri State Convention, Held at Jefferson City and St. Louis
26 (Mar. 1861).
166. Montana more closely resembles the syntax and punctuation of Missouri's
Confrontation Clause-than Nebraska's Clause. Furthermore, brief reference to Missouri
case law is made at the 1889 Montana Constitutional Convention during the discussion
of the Detention and Confrontation Clauses.
See Proceedings,supra note 1, at 258.
167. PA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 states: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a
right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and, in prosecutions by
indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he
cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be deprived of his life,
liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. The use of
a suppressed voluntary admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a
person may be permitted and shall not be construed as compelling a person to give
evidence against himself. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the General
Assembly may by statute provide for the manner of testimony of child victims or child
material witnesses in criminal proceedings, including the use of videotaped depositions
or testimony by closed-circuit television."
The Historical Notes reveal that the second sentence was added in 1984, the third
sentence was added in 1995, and the requirement that the defendant "meet the
witnesses face to face" for "be confronted with the witnesses against him" in 1995.
Prior to the removal of the "face to face" language, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court strictly enforced the defendant's right to confrontation: "Many people possessed
the trait of being loose-tongued or willing to say something behind a person's back that
they dare not or cannot truthfully say to his face or under oath in a courtroom.... We
have no right to disregard or (unintentionally) erode or distort any provision of the
Constitution, especially where, as here, its plain and simple language make its meaning
unmistakably clear. . . ." Commonwealth v. Russo, 131 A.2d 83, 88 (Pa. 1957).
168. Compare supra notes 149, 153, 156, and 167.
169. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 historical notes.
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Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 contained a
"substantially similar provision." 170 The similarities between
the Missouri Confrontation Clause and the Pennsylvania
Confrontation Clause are undeniable; therefore, Montana's
Confrontation Clause appears to have its roots in eighteenth
171
century Pennsylvanian jurisprudence.
The Missouri and Nebraska Supreme Courts interpret their
Confrontation Clause in accordance with the United States
Supreme Court. 72 However, the Montana Supreme Court, with
73
virtually the same provision as Missouri and Nebraska,
usually reserves its right to interpret Montana's confrontational
174
rights differently.
B. The Montana ConfrontationClause and the Montana
Supreme Court
The Montana Supreme Court has often recognized its right
to interpret a Montana constitutional provision as affording
greater protection than its federal counterpart. 175 Regardless of
170. Id.
171.
Certainly, the requirement of bringing accusers before a defendant has been
around much longer. As one article notes, it has been acknowledged for at least 1,500
years. Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and
Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481, 483 (1994).
However, this requirement applied only to the accuser, not the prosecution's witnesses.
Id. at 488.
172. The Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Schaal, 806 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Mo.
1991), stated: "[tlhe confrontation rights protected by the Missouri Constitution are the
same as those protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution."
(holding that videotaped statement of child victim of sexual abuse does not violate
defendant's confrontation or due process rights).
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State v. Jacob, 494 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Neb. 1993)
stated: "[w]e have held that the analysis under article I, § 11, is the same as that under
the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." (holding that excited utterance of
employee to her supervisor was reliable, did not offend the Confrontation Clause, and
was a deeply rooted hearsay exception).
173. The Montana Supreme Court has never officially commented on constitutional
similarities with Missouri or Nebraska.
174. Compare infra notes 175 and 184.
175. Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 215, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01 (1985); See Ranta v.
State,__ Mont. _, 958 P.2d 670, 675 (1998) ("[W]e refuse to 'march lock-step' with the
Unites States Supreme Court, even where the applicable state constitutional provisions
are nearly identical to the United States Constitution."); State v. Scheetz, 286 Mont. 41,
47, 950 P.2d 722, 725 (1997) ("[W]e have chosen not to 'march lock-step' with the United
States Supreme Court, even when applying nearly identical language."); Kills on Top v.
State, 279 Mont. 384, 420, 928 P.2d 182, 204 (1996) ("We have chosen not to 'march lockstep' with the United States Supreme Court, even when applying nearly identical
language."); Byers v. Mahoney, 279 Mont. 28, 32, 929 P.2d 202, 205 (1996) ("We have
stated that we will not 'march lock-step' with the United States Supreme Court where
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whether its reasoning is independently justified in light of
Nebraska and Missouri case law, 176 the court has failed to
illustrate any qualifiable difference between the Montana
Confrontation Clause and the federal version.
The court has held that the integrity of the fact-finding
process at trial is undermined when the parties do not have the
opportunity to confront each other or the witnesses. 177 However,
the right to confrontation has never been "absolute" in
Montana. 178 In Tooker v. State, 179 the court allowed depositions
to be introduced at trial due to the inability to locate
witnesses. 18 0 In State v. McCord,'8 ' the court allowed detectives
to introduce inculpatory statements made by an unavailable
witness that contradicted the defendant's testimony 8 2 The
court has also allowed child witnesses to testify in court through
the placement of a screen between the defendant and the
witnesses in a sexual assault case. 8 3 None of the above cases
allowed the defendant to confront his or her accuser face to face
at trial.
The court has stated that the Montana Constitution, using
substantially similar language to the Sixth Amendment, "grants
the same right." 8 4 The court explained the primary purpose
behind both provisions: "The primary purpose behind both of
these provisions was to prevent an accused from being convicted

constitutional issues are concerned, even if the applicable state constitution provisions
are identical or nearly identical to those of the United States Constitution.").
176. See supra note 172.
177. See Bonomarte v. Bonomarte, 263 Mont. 170, 175, 866 P.2d 1132, 1135 (1994)
(finding reversible error in divorce proceedings to allow wife to testify by telephone at
hearing on merits of custody and child support issues).
178. See State v. Vanella, 40 Mont. 326, 106 P. 364 (1910) (noting that the
Detention Clause illustrates that the right to confrontation is not absolute); State v.
Storm, 127 Mont. 414, 265 P.2d 971 (1953) (noting the right of a defendant in a criminal
case to meet the witnesses against him face to face is not absolute) (dissenting opinion);
Tooker v. State, 147 Mont. 207, 410 P.2d 923 (1966) (holding appellant was not denied
confrontational rights when depositions of unavailable witnesses were introduced at
trial).
179.
147 Mont. 207, 410 P.2d 923 (1966).
180. See id. at 219, 410 P.2d at 929.
181. 251 Mont. 317, 825 P.2d 194 (1992).
182. See id. at 323, 825 P.2d at 198.
183. State v. Davis, 253 Mont. 50, 830 P.2d 1309 (1992). Though the Montana
Supreme Court based its argument on the Sixth Amendment, it later stated that it
"adopted" the United States Supreme Court's reason for protecting sexually abused
children while testifying in court. State v. Widenhofer, 286 Mont. 341, 350, 950 P.2d
1383, 1388 (1997).
184. State v. Bell, 225 Mont. 83, 89, 731 P.2d 336, 340 (1987).
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solely on the basis of ex parte affidavits or depositions."18 5
Not since Storm 8 6 has the Montana Supreme Court relied
so heavily on the "face to face" phraseology of the Confrontation
Clause. In Storm, the defendant was charged with seconddegree murder. 8 7 The prosecution, over objection by the
defense, read testimony from an absent witness who testified at
the defendant's first trial into the record. 8 8 The court held that
admitting witness testimony from the defendant's first trial,
which was the only evidence linking the defendant at the scene
of the crime, was error. 8 9
The court applied a strict
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, relying on the
defendant's right to "face to face" confrontation.1 90 The lone
exception recognized by the court in Storm was the use of
depositions as allowed by the Detention Clause. 19'
The
confusing series of decisions following Storm has been
characterized as "bizarre"-an unreliable period where the court
excluded all former testimony in criminal actions, demanding
"face to face" confrontation. 92 Finally, the court overturned
itself in State v. Bouldin,193 abandoning the inexorable right to
face-to-face confrontation, thus returning Montana "to the
94
mainstream."1
C. The Federal ConfrontationClause and the United States
Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on
lab reports' admissibility.
Given the Court's stance on
confrontational issues, it would likely admit lab reports without
the author's testimony under a confrontational analysis and
hearsay analysis.' 95
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
127 Mont. 414, 265 P.2d 971 (1953).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 417-18, 265 P.2d at 972.

191.
192.

See id.
WILLIAM F. CROWLEY, EVIDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS at 485-86 (Fall 1998)

("If taken at face value, this declaration would have excluded any type of hearsay in
criminal actions . . . . For the sixteen years that this bizarre doctrine was in effect,
Montana law was at variance with that of every other American jurisdiction.").
193.
153 Mont. 276, 456 P.2d 830 (1969) (holding admission of testimony of absent
witness taken at preliminary hearing satisfied confrontation rights).
194. See CROWLEY, supra note 192, at 486.
195. See James W. Diehm, Protecting Criminal Defendants' Rights When the
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In 1965, the Supreme Court applied the Confrontation
Clause to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 196 noting the role of
cross-examination in exposing falsehood. 197 The Court held that
confrontation was a fundamental right that was essential to a
fair trial. 198 Douglas v. Alabama, 99 decided the same day as
Pointer, held that an adequate opportunity for crossexamination might satisfy the Clause, even in the absence of
face-to-face confrontation. 20 0 California v. Green 20 1 compared
the purposes of the confrontation clause in light of the "alleged
dangers" of admitting out-of-court statements:
Confrontation: (1)
insures that the witness will give his
statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness
of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a
penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to crossexamination, the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth;" 20 2 (3) permits the jury that is to decide the
defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness
in making
20 3
his statement, thus aiding in assessing his credibility.

In Chambers v. Mississippi, 20 4 the Court noted that the
right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may
"bow to accommodate other legitimate interest in the criminal
trial process." 20 5 Finally, in Ohio v. Roberts,20 6 the Court
attempted to establish guidelines for the hearsay declarant
absent from cross-examination at trial. 20 7 The Court held that
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that the
witness is unavailable, 20 8 and then the hearsay will be admitted
Government Adduces Scientific Evidence: The Confrontation Clause and Other
Alternatives - A Response to ProfessorGiannelli, 22 CAP. U.L. REV. 85, 94 (1993) ("Since
it appears that both the business records exception and the public records exception are
'firmly rooted' exceptions to the hearsay, the Court would probably find that the
admission of the [lab] report presents no confrontation issues.").
196. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
197. See id. at 404.
198. See id.
199. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
200. See id. at 418.
201. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).

202.

5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).

203.
204.

Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
410 U.S. 284 (1973).

205.
206.

Id. at 295 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)).
448 U.S. 56(1980).

207. See id.
208. See id. at 65 n.7 (holding that here the utility of trial confrontation is remote,
the prosecution is not required to produce a seemingly available witness).
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if it bears proper indicia of reliability. 2 9 If the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the Court may infer
reliability. 210 Lacking indicia of reliability or firm roots in
hearsay exception, the Court still may admit the evidence if it
211
contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Subsequent cases limited the Roberts unavailability
requirement to situations involving former testimony. 2 2 In
United States v. Inadi,21 3 the court clarified Roberts in that it
"cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no
out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government
without a showing that the declarant is unavailable." 21 4 The
court has stated: "the right to confront accusatory witnesses may
be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial
only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and only where the testimony's
reliability is otherwise assured."2 15 While it is not clear in what
cases the Supreme Court will impose an unavailability
requirement, it is not expected to be a major consideration for
admitting lab reports from forensic scientists in light of the
216
other factors of reliability or firmly rooted hearsay exceptions.
D. Summary Analysis of Legislative Intent and Judicial
Interpretationof Montana's ConfrontationClause
The court maintains it has authority to interpret the
Montana Confrontation Clause to afford greater protection than
the United States Constitution. 2 7 Certainly, the court has the
power to interpret acts of the legislature as it sees fit.
209. See id. at 65-66.
210. See id. at 66.
211. See id. Statements that contain "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
include self-inculpatory statements, Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), and statements
which are considered so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little weight as
to its reliability, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
212. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392-92 (1986) ("Roberts should not be
read as an abstract answer to questions not presented in that case, but rather as a
resolution of the issue the Court said it was examining .... "); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 354 ("Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a necessary
part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court
statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.").
213. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
214. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
215. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 837 (1990) (citation omitted).
216. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22
CAP. U.L. REV. 45, 78 (1993).
217. See State v. Clark,__ Mont. _, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (1998).
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Nevertheless, it is troubling to find that no legislative authority
exists to support the Court's empowering conclusion that the
framers of the Montana Constitutions either intended or
suggested an independent state interpretation that differs from
the federal version.
The Research Analyst for the Bill of Rights Committee, Rick
Applegate, cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
and aligns Montana's Confrontation Clause with a federal
interpretation. The Constitutional Convention of 1889, which
adopted the present Clause, also found it very much in line with
the federal version; one delegate appears to be under the
impression that the federal version uses the language "face to
face." 2 18 While the 1884 Convention most likely borrowed the
original language of the Clause from Missouri, it is doubtful that
they believed their adoption of "face to face" language was
intended to be a departure from a federal interpretation of the
procedural rights of an accused. The Clause that exists today is
one that was originally adopted by a Convention that had
neither legal authority nor the conveniences of time or money to
219
explore their ramifications.
In settings such as the 1889 Constitutional Convention in
Montana, arbitrary linguistic choices often have to be made.
Delegates may misconstrue precedent, 220 or have completely
different intentions than their word choice suggests, or may
simply contradict themselves. 22' To ignore literary imprecision
on the part of constitutional drafters is to ignore shortcomings of
human expression.
Though maintaining the right to interpret Montana's
Confrontation Clause differently from the federal version, the
Montana Supreme Court has not done so in the past. In a 1987
case, the Montana Supreme Court stated that Montana's
Confrontation Clause contains substantially similar language,
and "grants the same right."222 The court has explicitly stated
that the purposes behind both Clauses were identical. 223 The
Montana Supreme Court has never interpreted the Montana
Confrontation Clause to grant an absolute right.224 The United
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See supra note 142.
Montana ConstitutionalRevision Committee 4-5 (1970).
See supra note 128 and 142.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
State v. Bell, 225 Mont. 83, 89, 731 P.2d 336, 340 (1987).
See id. at 88-90, 731 P.2d at 340.
See supra note 178.
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States Supreme Court in accordance has also recognized
225
confrontational exceptions.
In Clark, the Montana Supreme Court cited State v.
Stever 226 to illustrate that they were not bound by a United
Sixth
of the
interpretation
Court
Supreme
States
Amendment. 227 In Stever, the court declared it was not bound by
the United States Supreme Court, and then proceeded to adopt
out-ofthe reasoning of United States v. Inadi in admitting an
228
court statement made by a non-testifying coconspirator.
V. THE PURPOSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
The court fails to explain why Rule 803(8) of the Montana
Rules of Evidence violates the Confrontation Clause beyond a
reasonable doubt. Clark's right to confront and cross-examine
his "accuser" was not violated by the portion of 803(8) that
governs the introduction of state crime lab reports. 229 Clark's
argument is best supported by a theoretical absolute right of
confrontation, which the Montana Supreme Court has expressly
rejected in the past. 230 Clark claims that he is entitled to an
unfettered right to cross-examine the "technician," observe her
at trial, cast doubt on the accuracy of her report, and question
the chain of custody. 231 The Montana Supreme Court agrees
2 32
that Rule 803(8) infringes upon Clark's confrontational rights.
The court explained the purpose of cross-examination:
Cross-examination is the hallmark of our system of justice because
it produces truth. Such things as the demeanor of a witness, his
or her body language, and a witness's hesitancy in giving
as the
testimony, often communicate as much as to the fact-finder
233
spoken words. All of this is lost in a written deposition.

The court seems primarily interested in the production of
225. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (holding that admission of
nontestifying codefendant's confession did not violate felony-murder defendant's right
under confrontation clause); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (holding that
the Confrontation Clause does not categorically prohibit child witness in child abuse case
from testifying against the defendant at trial, outside of defendant's presence).
226. 225 Mont. 336, 732 P.2d 853 (1987).
227. See State v. Clark, __ Mont. __, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (1998).
228. See Stever, 225 Mont. at 344, 732 P.2d at 858.
229. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 81.
230.

See supra note 178.

231.

See State v. Clark,

232.

See id.at

233.

Id.

__, 964

Mont. -,964 P.2d at 770.
P.2d at 771.
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truth through nonverbal forms of communication, namely the
demeanor and body language of the scientist.234 The forensic
scientist, who is not likely to be able to distinguish one report
from another, should not be concerned with her demeanor or
body language.
As noted by one scholar: "Personal
attractiveness, wardrobe, mannerisms, unusual speech patterns,
or other visible characteristics of a witness that may be
unrelated to truthfulness may influence whether the jurors or
235
judge will credit a witness's testimony."
The forensic scientist's report is based on objective facts, not
opinions. Such is the nature of science. It is beyond this
author's comprehension how the body language of a forensic
scientist illustrates the validity of a urinalysis or GC/MS
analysis. For the finder of fact to question the content of the
report based on the scientist's demeanor dilutes the purpose and
importance of cross-examination at trial. As Judge Easterbrook
pointed out in United States v. Pierre,236 the question is not
whether the scientist believes the tests to be accurate, but
whether they are accurate. 237 The defendant should bear the
burden of disproving scientific facts that are a result of the
regularly conducted activity of experienced forensic scientists.
This could easily be accomplished by a subpoena of the scientist,
thus forcing her to testify, or an independently conducted test by
another lab.
The court also stated that evaluating the hesitancy of the
forensic scientist to recall her report produces truth. 238 Given
the volume of reports the lab must analyze every year, the
hesitancy of the forensic scientist on the witness stand should be
expected by the trier of fact. It is unlikely the forensic scientist
had anything to add to the detailed report, which was likely
written several months or more prior to trial. In addition to
field and trial work, the Montana Supreme Court now mandates
that the forensic scientist spend time reviewing her work to
ensure against hesitancy in front of the fact finder.
The court formally recognizes Clark's fundamental right at

234. See id.
235. Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations,40 U. FLA.
L. REV. 863, 899 (1988). Massaro notes one commentator's conclusion that "people
generally do no better at detecting whether someone is lying than they would if they
chose randomly." Id. at 899 n. 130 (citation omitted).
236. 47 F.3d 241 (7th Cir. 1995).
237. See id. at 243 (emphasis added).
238. See State v. Clark, __ Mont.__, 964 P.2d 766, 771 (1998).
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trial to delve into the experience, background, and training of
the "technician," as well as the method and manner of the tests
conducted. 239 A great deal of Clark's newly founded rights can
be found by examining the codified licensing requirements of the
board of clinical laboratory science practitioners. 240 The court
declines to answer whether all of the scientists who work on a
sample will be required to testify, and have their backgrounds
examined.
The question also remains whether those who
participate in the peer review, as well as the subsequent
supervisory review, 24 1 must also testify as to their qualifications.
Requiring the forensic scientist to testify on objective facts
leaves a clause in the Montana Constitution that serves no
purpose, but is merely a series of words without the
companionship of common sense. The Confrontation Clause, as
part of a living, breathing Constitution, should strive to preserve
ideals, not simply dismiss rational arguments based on imported
expressions or hastily drafted words. Concepts such as the
preservation of dignity of the defendant, the search for
trustworthiness and reliability should be the goals of the court,
and the Confrontation Clause should be the vehicle. Courts
have long recognized this objective, and have sculpted the
Clause accordingly.
The Montana Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause is by no means unprecedented.
Originalists have long lamented over what has been deemed the
erosion of the Clause's plain meaning. Justice Scalia, in the
dissent of Maryland v. Craig,242 chastised the Supreme Court:
Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a
categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of
prevailing current opinion. The Sixth Amendment provides, with
unmistakable clarity, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
right... to be confronted with the
accused shall enjoy the
243
witnesses against him."

As Scalia points out, a contemporary interpretation of legislative
language has the potential to destroy the plain meaning of the
text. However, modernity gives rise to problems that were not
239. Id.
240. See supra note 64.
241. See Nov. 11, 1998 letter, supra note 63.
242. 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that confrontation clause did not prohibit a child
witness in child abuse case from testifying against the defendant, outside of defendant's
physical presence, by a one-way closed circuit television).
243. Id. at 860-61 (alteration in original).
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contemplated by the framers of constitutions. Alternatives to
complying with an inexorable Confrontation Clause, such as
allowing child victims to testify via one-way closed circuit
television, 24 or allowing a scientific lab report into the
courtroom without needless testimony, should not be dismissed
simply because it is believed that the meaning of archaic
phraseology is understood.
VI. CAPTURING THE ESSENCE OF CONFRONTATION
Given the unanimity of the court's decision in Clark, the
aforementioned confrontational exceptions could be vulnerable
to a judicial attack. 245 Before the purpose of cross-examination
is forgotten, the Montana legislature should consider
modernizing the Confrontation Clause's wording. Montana can
again look to Pennsylvania for guidance.
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, relying on
Confrontation Clause which at that time
Pennsylvania's
required "face to face" confrontation, 246 faced the dilemma as to
whether to allow a child victim of sexual assault to testify
In
against the defendant via closed circuit television. 24 7
248
with
was
charged
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, the defendant
rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, indecent
assault, corrupting the morals of a minor, and endangering the
welfare of his five year old daughter. 249 A psychologist testified
that the victim had become withdrawn, and was concerned that
if the victim were forced to testify in the presence of the
defendant, her psychological progress could be impaired. 250 As a
result, the court allowed the victim to testify via closed circuit
25 1
television from another room, accompanied by her mother.
252
The child was linked to the courtroom by a microphone.
While the child could not see the people in the courtroom, she
was able to hear them and respond to questions. 253 The
defendant was subsequently convicted. The court overturned
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
discussion supra Part IV.B.
supra note 167.
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281 (Pa. 1991).
id. at 282.
id.
id.
id.
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A-2d 281, 282 (Pa. 1991).
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his conviction, holding that testimony by the child victim via
closed circuit television violated the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which required witnesses against the defendant to meet him or
her "face to face."254
The Pennsylvania legislature responded.
In 1995, it
amended the Pennsylvania Confrontation Clause, substituting
"be confronted with the witnesses against him" for "meet the
witnesses face to face," and specifically allowed for child victims
255
to testify by closed-circuit television.
Illinois experienced similar problems with its "face to face"
language. In 1994, the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a
statute enabling child victims of sexual abuse to testify against
the defendant via closed circuit television, citing the importance
of the literal compliance of face-to-face confrontation. 256 Later
that year, an amendment substituting "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him or her" for "to meet the witnesses face to
257
face" was passed.
Amending the language of Montana's Confrontation Clause
would preserve valuable exceptions and eliminate an inexorable
right to face-to-face confrontation. It would also allow judges, in
rare circumstances, more room to protect child victims and
eliminate wasteful testimony such as a forensic scientist's
recollection of performing standardized tests, thereby promoting
judicial efficiency.
Amending the Clause would eliminate
confusing periods of interpretation, as was seen during the
Storm period, and allow judges to analyze the necessity of
calling witnesses in criminal trials on a case-by-case basis. As
technology has shown the judicial arena, creative and equally
effective methods can be used to allow the fact-finder to analyze
the witness' veracity without requiring a staring match between
the defendant and the witness.

254. Id. at 281-82. Chief Justice Nix dissented, noting: "[a]lthough not expressly
stated, the federal constitutional provision clearly guarantees a face-to-face
confrontation; notwithstanding, it does not graphically express that protection by the use
of the phrase, "face-to-face," as does the Pennsylvania Constitution. Moreover, the
attempt by the majority to latch upon this stylistic difference in the two provisions as a
basis to support the contention that our state constitutional provision provides an
absolute right of confrontation is not only superficial but is indeed demonstrably
incorrect." Id. at 285.
255. See supra note 167.
256. See Illinois v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ill. 1994).
257. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8 historical note.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the courtroom of the twenty-first century will
be inundated with scientific evidence. While the courts should
view empirical and demonstrative evidence with a cautious eye,
there is no reason why tests conducted by a forensic scientist
should be questioned through trial testimony.
For the
aforementioned reasons, the testimony adds little if anything to
the report itself. A number of remedies and safeguards are
available to the defendant, including subpoena of the forensic
scientist or an independent test by another testing agency. If
the defendant alleges that the procedure followed was careless
and sloppy, thus calling the competence of the scientist into
question, the defendant has every right to demand the scientist's
presence in court through subpoena. Absent such an allegation,
it is rash and unreasonable to presuppose that any product from
the lab is unreliable.
The forensic scientist often testifies over uncontested
matters. 258 A majority of courts have noted the remote utility of
calling such witnesses, recognizing the firmly rooted exception of
lab reports. The court's desire to distinguish Montana in the
constitutional arena has left the state with a minority rule that
it can scarcely afford financially. The Montana Supreme Court
Commission on Rules of Evidence appreciated these financial
and labor difficulties in 1989 when it promulgated the 803(8)
exception to the Montana Rules of Evidence. As admirable as
the court's decision is to protect the defendant against any
possible presumption of guilt, Montana, with a small population
and large geographical area, cannot afford all of the
constitutional luxuries the court would bestow unto it. The
court should interpret the Montana Bill of Rights prudently and
conservatively, and side with the United States Supreme Court
when evidence exists to support a federal interpretation.
Whatever the source is for the Montana Confrontation
Clause, there is no denying a need for the preservation of
personal confrontation; something in human nature demands it.
As noted by one scholar:
The United States military acknowledges this intrinsic value of
face-to-face encounters by its practice of delivering the news of the
death of a serviceman or woman in person. Likewise, in the
business world it is 'indecent' to terminate an employee with a

258.

See Brief of Amici Curiae at Exhibit A-4, Clark (No. 97-096).
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letter, instead of in a face-to-face exchange.

259

Face-to-face confrontation ensures that those who would
normally lie or mislead the finder of fact are confronted by the
defendant, and their falsehoods are exposed. The adversarial
process furthers the dignity and integrity of the judicial process.
Unfortunately, the central purpose of the Confrontation
Clause is lost in Clark. The court has transformed it into a
procedural rule that neither breathes nor flexes, but merely
exists.
Based on Clark's sweeping language, the Montana
criminal practitioner would be remiss not to utilize Clark to
question every hearsay exception. Unless the court is willing to
recognize the true purpose of the Confrontation Clause, the days
of Storm may be back. The Confrontation Clause should be
concerned with providing the accused a trial that is directed
toward the pursuit of truth, not strict adherence to criminal
procedural rules which were promulgated in the early
nineteenth century. If the court is unwilling to recognize the
symbolic language of the Confrontation Clause, the Montana
legislature should join Illinois and Pennsylvania, 260 and revise
the language of the Confrontation Clause to conform with
twentieth century jurisprudence.

259.
260.

See Massaro, supra note 235, at 905.
See supra note 119.
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